THE UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF JOB INSECURITY, 1966-1986

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Abstract

In the first half of the paper the evidence concerning the costs of job insecurity is presented. There is now sufficient good research data to conclude that job insecurity is damaging to psychological health, marriages and employee motivation, and contributes to "cycles of disadvantage". In the second half of the paper flows out of secure and insecure jobs within British labour markets are analyzed using a work-histories dataset. Not only is it the case that flows from secure to insecure jobs were more common in the 1980s than in the 1970s and 1960s, but it also apparent that the risk of a transition from a secure job into an insecure job is much greater for those in less advantaged jobs. The negative consequence of this further polarisation of the UK labour market are discussed.

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1. Introduction

Job insecurity has become a major research topic in the 1990s, paralleling its greatly increased prevalence in the UK and other industrialised nations. This attention is justified for a number of reasons when one considers the findings of that research. This paper starts by reviewing the recent literature on the psychological, social and economic effects of job insecurity on (a) psychological well-being, (b) long-term labour-market instability, (c) the "underclass", (d) consumer behaviour and (e) employee motivation. Then in the second half of the paper a set of empirical analyses are undertaken to investigate the correlates and possible causes of flows between secure and insecure jobs.

2. The Psychological, Social and Economic Effects of Job Insecurity

a. Job insecurity and psychological well-being

There is now good evidence from several independent researchers and from several countries that there is a direct, causal link between job insecurity and psychological well-being in the form of anxiety, depression and stress (see literature reviews in Burchell, 1994 and Hartley et al 1992 and more recent evidence in Dekker & Schaufeli, 1995, Heaney, Israel & House, 1994 and Ferrie, Shipley, Marmott, Stansfield & Davey-Smith, 1995). This reduction in psychological well-being seems to be of about the same magnitude as that caused by unemployment, and may in part be for the same reason - in Burchell (1994) I argue that both unemployment and job insecurity detract from the individual's ability to plan and control his or her own life.

In the same way, and perhaps to the same extent, that unemployment causes a lot of individual misery, there is now evidence emerging that it also causes social as well as individual problems. For instance,

Hughes & Galinsky (1994) found job insecurity to be linked with quality of marital interactions, Larson, Wilson & Beley (1994) with family dysfunction and Lampard (1994) with marital breakdown.

One important recent finding concerned the effects of extended periods of job insecurity. It might have been argued that the harmful stress caused by job insecurity in the 1980s was primarily caused because it was a new phenomenon; once employees learned to adjust to more flexible working practices they may be able to tolerate job insecurity with few problems. However, Heaney, Israel & House's study of US car manufacturing workers suggested that, far from adjusting to long term job insecurity, chronic levels of insecurity had an independent effect on job satisfaction and physical symptoms in addition to their current levels of job insecurity (1994). Thus, job insecurity may be a cumulative stressor, increasing its effects over time.

Another recent development in the literature on job security and psychological well-being is the finding that job insecurity does not affect all individuals equally, and we are starting to build a picture of who is most vulnerable to it. Roskies, Louis-Guerin & Fournier (1993) found that those Canadian employees with "positive personality attributes" were hardier to job insecurity than those with a generally more negative outlook on life. Orpen (1993) also found "job dependence" to be a moderator of the way in which employees responded to threats to their jobs. Job insecurity was felt more acutely among those in his sample of Australian manufacturing employees who were more dependent on their jobs. This may explain a previous finding that, on aggregate, men suffer more when faced with job insecurity than women (Burchell, 1994).

b. Job insecurity and longer-term labour-market instability

Job insecurity is not a stable state; rather, job insecurity is often a route into unemployment, or a period of labour market instability as an individual oscillates between unemployment and further insecure jobs (Daniel, 1990). In contrast to neoclassical models, many other

approaches to labour markets have emphasised the importance of an individual's own employment history as being a principal explanatory variable for their current position. For instance, an individual with a history of unemployment or redundancy could be forced into a downward spiral because they can not get established back into the core labour force, or perhaps because employers become prejudiced against them. Some theories even suggest a recursive relationship between the employee's personality or attitudes and their employment. For instance, Kohn & Schooner (1983) suggest that the richer cognitive environments of primary segment employees foster intellectual development which aids career advancement, whereas those who are initially assigned to mundane jobs will not develop and therefore not advance. Burchell & Rubery (1990) emphasised the enduring nature of labour market disadvantage by clustering employees into "segments". The segment containing individuals with the most advantaged current jobs in terms of pay and skill also had pasts which showed steady advancement and high levels of optimism about the future. In contrast, the segment containing individuals with the worst present jobs also showed a history of downward trajectories and little cause for optimism over the future.

However, several recent analyses of British labour markets have found little evidence of continued disadvantage or instability in the labour market. For instance, Gallie (1994) compared the labour market histories of those who were unemployed at the time of a 1985 survey of six UK local labour markets with the labour market histories of those who were employed at the time of the survey. Once important demographic variables (such as age and gender) had been controlled for, there was very little difference between the unemployed (long or short-term) and employees in the number of jobs that they had held prior to the survey. Similarly, a comparison of the time spent in the longest completed job showed that there was no difference between employees and the unemployed (in fact, for men, the unemployed had spent a few months, on average, longer in their longest jobs, but this was cancelled out by a reverse effect for women).

Gershuny and Marsh's UK study of unemployment in labour market histories (1994) also concludes that there is little evidence for longer-term disadvantage in the labour market. Whereas there was quite good predictivity from one year to the next in a given individual's history of unemployment, there was virtually no consistency over longer periods. Even the high predictive power over the shorter time spells may have been an artifact of their method which involved dividing work histories into calendar years. But the lack of predictive power over longer periods was surprising, particularly given the proneness of this method to inflated correlations due to "residual" or "unmeasured" heterogeneity.

By contrast, Payne & Payne's analysis of the British Labour Force Survey (LFS) from the years 1983-1989 does show a clear mechanism by which labour market disadvantage can polarise individuals (1993). After controlling for demographic differences, individuals who were unemployed a year before the survey date were many times more likely to be in temporary jobs than those who were in employment a year before. Presumably this is part of a vicious cycle as many of those temporary jobs in turn lead to spells of unemployment. A similar effect for previously unemployed men entering part-time employment accounted for a sizable proportion of all male part-time employment. These findings are consistent with Daniel's study of the inflow into employment from unemployment in London in the very early 1980s, where recurrent spells of unemployment were found to be common. Similar patterns have also been found in qualitative studies, where job security becomes an over-riding concern after redundancy and re-employment (eg. Fineman, 1987).

This apparently contradictory set of findings may be due to the methods used. Some of the indicators used of, say, instability, could be too blunt to measure anything meaningful. One employee may change jobs frequently because she gains frequent promotions in an occupational labour market characterised by skill shortages, another may change jobs frequently because they can only obtain casual or temporary work. Similarly an employee who is at high risk of unemployment may be forced to take very risk-averse decisions over

jobs which may reduce their earnings or promotion potential, thus remaining in the same job for a very long period of time. So, without a better understanding of an individual's trajectory, and their reasons for changing jobs, little can be understood from simple aggregate variables such as the number of previous jobs held or the duration of their longest job.

Another source of discrepancy in these findings may be due to differences in the mobility of different types of workers. For instance, a French study suggested that precarious jobs held by adult males are much more likely to be followed by stable jobs (48%-71%) than is the case for adult females (35%-55%) or young males (19%) (INSEE, 1993 cited in Alogoskoufis et al, 1995).

c. Job insecurity and "the underclass"

One of the recent fashions in sociology in many countries has been the "underclass". Recently several discussions of polarisation have framed their debate in terms of the implications for the existence of an underclass. In this section I will argue that this literature has been hindered by widely varying definitions of the underclass. Discussion of the vagueness of the term underclass is not new (Westergaard, 1992; Mann, 1994). Some see the underclass as a new phenomenon, others point out that it is very similar indeed to other notions which have occurred in history such as the "residuum", "les exclus" or the "lumpen-proletariate". The assumed causes of the underclass also vary widely; illegitimate births, crime, single-mothers, alcohol abuse, physical or mental disability, begging and promiscuity have all been blamed, as well as low or disadvantaged labour market participation. For some authors, a common anti-establishment culture is a requirement of any underclass. For some authors the underclass is, by definition, malevolent or threatening to society, but others would include very unthreatening groups, such as retired people living in poverty, as members of an underclass. How do the studies of labour market marginalisation fit into this debate?

Gallie (1994), among others, differentiates two different versions of the underclass thesis, one conservative, one radical, and tests to see whether either can be applied to the unemployed. The conservative version essentially blames the victim, attributing persistent labour market marginalisation as being due to lower work commitment. His first test of this is by exploring the past labour market stability of those who were unemployed at the time of the survey (see above)[1]. His second test of the conservative version is by comparing the work-commitment of the unemployed with employees. Here he finds, if anything, the unemployed to be more committed to work than employees, so he again rejects the conservative version. He then tests a radical version of the underclass thesis, that enduring disadvantage in the labour market causes a stratum of society which is more deprived economically than the "conventional" lowest class, the lowest skilled manual workers. Furthermore, it is hypothesised that this dependence on state support, material deprivation and exclusion from employment will lead to a form of consciousness which is distinctive from working class culture and difficult for society to channel through traditional institutions. In the case of material deprivation the case for the unemployed being an underclass is strong - they experience far greater levels of economic hardship than employees, and their difficulties increase with the duration of their unemployment. This level of disadvantage is aggravated by the poorer level of social support that the unemployed respondents reported. But the effects of these experiences on political attitudes and behaviour was less marked. Unemployment did make individuals more "collectivist" in their beliefs, and more likely to vote Labour. However, there was very little evidence that they were more politically active, nor that they were moving to non-mainstream or more extreme political parties. Thus Gallie finds no evidence in favour of a conservative version of the underclass thesis and only limited evidence in favour of his radical version. Similarly, Morris (1994) concludes that there is no evidence of an identifiable underclass in the UK with a shared set of anti-establishment attitudes. This is hardly surprising, since proponents of such a theory have wanted to tar very disparate outgroups (eg. single mothers, divorcees, petty criminals) with the same brush.

Payne & Payne (1994) find the only group that may have been permanently detached from the British labour market following the 1979-1983 recession are older men, but because they do not fit the stereotype of angry young men nor are seen as a threat to society, the authors choose not to class them as a potential underclass. Gallie & Marsh's (1994) conclusions, based on the cumulative evidence of many analyses of British datasets, was that, although there were cycles of disadvantage, those cycles were not closed enough to create a bottom level that could be given the term "underclass".

Other social commentators use the concept of the underclass to describe the inequality that has come about recently, but here the term is being used loosely and journalistically (eg. Field, 1989). Futurologists such as Rifkin (1995) make predictions about an underclass of manual workers who simply have no place in the future economy, with neither the skills to take part in the new high-technology workforce, nor the means to purchase its products. The prediction is speculative but worrying.

To conclude, no general British labour market study has found anything like convincing evidence of an underclass. But to assert that there is no underclass is perhaps an overstatement; however, we can be confident that if there is an underclass it certainly cannot be large enough to account for anything but a very small proportion of those living in severe disadvantage or poverty. A very small minority living in extreme disadvantage may well not be noticed in a survey of general labour-market trends. Groups which are very geographically clustered or which are only a very small minority of the workforce could easily be missed in an aggregate analysis.

Indeed, the best evidence for the existence of a meaningful and identifiable underclass suggests that it might be very localised (see Woodward, 1995). An alternative approach to polarisation studies have been more detailed investigations of particular geographic areas; this has the advantage that the spatial component of polarisation can also be studied. Byrne's study of Middlesbrough (a northern English industrial conurbation) is a good example of this, using data from the

census of population, the census of employment and an annual local survey (1995). Byrne concludes that there has been marked polarisation between the 1970s and 1990s, but labour market flexibilisation does not figure in his explanation. Rather, he attributes the polarisation to a combination of deindustrialization, an urban housing policy which concentrated the poor into ghettos, poor schooling in those areas and a benefit system that discriminates against two-parent families. It should be noted, however, that Middlesbrough is in many ways atypical as a labour market; it was very successful in the 1950s and 1960s, but has since suffered the severe decline of many northern industrial towns. A similar study of a buoyant labour market on the south coast of England, Southampton, gave a somewhat different picture (Pinch & Storey, 1991).

d. Job insecurity and consumer behaviour

Job insecurity not only affects individuals' psychological health, it also affects their behaviour as consumers. The continuing high levels of job insecurity have been blamed by many for the low level of consumer confidence (or the lack of the "feel-good factor") which has endured even after unemployment has been falling consistently for many months. UK consumer spending, whether in the retail or housing market, has been much slower to recover since the early – 1990s recession and this has been put down to job insecurity more than anything else (Parker, 1994). There has been considerable speculation about the link between the housing market and job insecurity, and forecasts that, if the current levels of labour market insecurity continue, house prices are unlikely to return to the prices that they reached prior to the current recession for many years. For instance, Hutton (1995) notes the record levels of repossessions in the UK (300,000 in 5 years), the estimated one million homeowners in a negative equity situation, and the 3 in 10 mortgage borrowers who have received legal warnings having fallen behind with their payments, and he concludes that we are facing an "economic and social earthquake". Job insecurity, along with changes in mortgage tax relief and the credit-led consumer overconfidence in the late 1980s, were responsible for this, but while the latter two were

transient, this crisis will not disappear while job security continues to diminish. As well as the impact on the "home-owning democracy" (one of the foundations of the conservative vote) this will have dire consequences too for employment in the construction and related industries.

So the very same people, who may be stimulating our economy by (supposedly) ever greater productivity growth through their job insecurity, are at the same time stifling economic recovery when they wear their hats as consumers!

e. Job insecurity and employee motivation

The notion that job insecurity will increase motivation is implicit to efficiency wage models; employees would shirk if it were not for the threat of dismissal. Furthermore it claims that if it is more difficult for employers to dismiss shirking employees, then there will be less disincentive to shirk. However, if those ridiculously simplistic notions of employee motivation are dropped for more realistic ones, those findings are not born out in practice. Indeed, there is some evidence emerging that insecure employees may be less productive employees. The main focus of research on redundancies to date has focussed on the individuals who lost their jobs. However, there is growing concern that the "survivors", those who keep their jobs, may themselves experience more than just relief. Following on from similar research in the US (eg. Brockner, 1992, Brockner et al, 1985, 1986), Horsted & Doherty (1995) surveyed 170 personnel in Financial Services, where many of the major employers have been "rightsizing" through large-scale involuntary redundancy programmes. They found decreased motivation, morale, confidence and loyalty and increased stress, scepticism, anger and bitterness, which they labelled "Survivor Syndrome".

Brockner's research arrived at similar conclusions, although he emphasised that the legacy of redundancy programmes was contingent on the way in which they were managed. Typically companies provided careful assistance for those who were "outplaced" in the

form of counselling and career guidance, but they ignored the survivors. If the survivors were kept informed and led to believe that the redundancy programme was carefully managed and, most importantly, fair, then Brockner found that it could result in increased motivation among the survivors. Brockner et al (1992) found a non-linear inverted-U relationship between job security and work-effort in a sample of retail chain employees (survivors of recent redundancies) in the US. Work effort was low for those with highest and lowest levels of job insecurity, but higher for moderate levels of job insecurity.

Hallier & Lyon's (1996) study of UK managers facing threat of redundancy paints a more elaborate picture. Their sample of 42 men was selected by virtue of their contacting an employment agency following an announcement of immanent redundancies. They conducted five separate semi-structured interviews with each manager over a 12 month period.

The earliest interviews were conducted in the period after the managers had received their warnings of impending redundancies. Widespread shock was characteristic of this stage, despite the fact that the managers had been aware of ongoing "downsizing" programmes, and had in many cases overseen redundancy programmes for their subordinates. There was also a lot of searching for internal attributions for their own post having been chosen. Feelings of resentment, bitterness, anger and disbelief were commonly expressed during this period, and a deep questioning of the trust that they had placed in the employer. Their final psychological state was dependent, it was claimed, on their fate in the labour market. Some were reprieved by sideways movements into other management posts; some were demoted into engineering jobs (often alongside their old subordinates); some were finally "outplaced" but soon found other jobs; some remained unemployed for many months. In all but the reprieved group, there was a deep questioning of the trust which had previously been taken for granted in their relationships with their employers. Most felt that they would never return to the previous levels of unquestioning commitment to their jobs.

The evidence concerning the legacy of trust among survivors of redundancy programmes is therefore scarce, and it suggests the relationship is a complex one. It would be unwise to generalise from a small number of self-report studies on two very different types of employees, but it is important to consider the possibility that labour market insecurity may disrupt the tacit relationship between employer and employee.

Many different traditions within the social sciences place great emphasis on the nature of the tacit understandings which govern the relationship between employer and employee. Alogoskoufis et al (1995), in arguing against deregulating job security as a method of reducing unemployment, contend that job security lengthens the horizon of job-specific investment decisions, thus encouraging training and human-capital development. Similarly, in the transaction costs or the institutionalist literatures the cooperation which comes more easily to the traditional employment relationship over relationships outside of or between firms is sometimes judged to be the very raison d'etre of firms (Hodgson, 1995). Once the relative permanence of that relationship is withdrawn, the very nature of the relationship may change fundamentally. An example of this came in a report from the accountants Ernst & Young who blamed job insecurity in financial services for increased levels of fraud in the UK, as employment relationships tended towards lower trust (1995).

3. Flows Between Secure and Insecure Jobs

Whilst there have been several studies of the influence of job insecurity on related labour market phenomena, such as stability and unemployment, there have been no investigations into the processes by which employees become insecure.

In the youth labour market it is likely that many individuals with unstable employment patterns have never been able to establish themselves in secure jobs. However, many older workers will have made transitions out of secure jobs into insecure jobs. This paper explores the nature of that transition using work history data - what

factors influence employees in secure jobs to move into insecure jobs? Are particular types of industries, occupations, or types of jobs or employers responsible for dislodging individuals from secure jobs into insecure jobs?

There are two more specific questions which are of particular interest. Firstly, has the rate of flow from secure to insecure jobs changed over time? There has been much discussion of greater levels of job insecurity in more recent times than in, say, the 1945 to 1970 period. The use of work history data gives an ideal chance to test this assumption. Secondly, the role of insecure work in polarising or equalising labour market disadvantage can be investigated. Much recent research into job insecurity has targeted specific occupations or industries, and in many cases they have been more advantaged workers: Horsted & Doherty (1995) studied the financial services sector, Hallier & Lyon (1996) studied middle managers, Roskies & Louis-Guerin (1990) studied managers, Fineman (1987) studied white-collar workers, to name but a few. If it really is the case that more advantaged and professional workers have been hit the hardest by increasing job insecurity, then increased job insecurity may have served to reduce the inequality in labour market advantage, offsetting the greater inequality in wages which has emerged since the late 1970s (see Freeman, 1994). Alternatively, if the less advantaged or less skilled workers are the ones who are more likely to become insecure, then the increased insecurity will exacerbate the polarisation between the advantaged and disadvantaged sectors of the workforce.

a. Method

In order to study the flows from job security into job insecurity, a dataset of transitions between jobs will be used, created from the Social Change and Economic Life Initiative (SCELI) dataset. The Social Change and Economic Life Initiative was a large interdisciplinary project which set out to investigate six British labour markets at a number of different levels (ie. individuals, households, communities and employers). This paper is primarily concerned with the analysis of one of the most complex parts of the dataset which was

collected in the initiative, the work histories of 6,111 randomly sampled adults aged between 20 and 60 and residing in one of the six local labour markets[2] in the latter half of 1986.

In addition to a conventional questionnaire component, the interviews with each of these respondents contained a very thorough work history element. They were asked about every job and spell without a job (for example, unemployment, full-time housework) that they had experienced since leaving full-time education. This was done sequentially, with checks to minimise errors associated with forgotten events. As well as a job title for each period in paid employment, questions about a number of other features of each job were also asked, such as trade union membership, size and industrial sector of employer, hours of work, the reason for leaving that job, and how secure that job was considered to be. The number of different activities recorded for each individual varied from none (where the respondent was still in full-time education) to over 50, with a mean of about eight activities or six jobs.

As this dataset was non-rectangular[3] in its raw form it requires more complex methods of analysis than that of a standard survey. The particular method used here - the analysis of transitions - was described in detail in Burchell (1993) and the reader is referred to that paper for a more detailed description of the method, and a discussion of its strengths and weaknesses. An innovative feature is that, rather than treating the individual or the job as the unit of analysis, the transition between two adjoining jobs is the unit of analysis. This gives particular advantages when studying labour market flows.

The dataset is created by pooling all the transitions between adjacent jobs in the work histories of all 6,111 individuals. However, as the work histories for older cohorts go back as far as the 1940s, while the work histories for the youngest cohorts go back only a few years, the dataset was "rectangularised" by taking only job transitions which occurred between 1966 and 1986, and which occurred whilst the incumbent was less than 40 years old. This eradicates the age and calender-time biases inherent in data collected using recalled work

histories, and also eliminates jobs and transitions which happened more than 20 years before the date of the interview, and were therefore subject to more severe recall biases. The loss of all transitions occurring while the individual is over the age of 40 is regrettable[4], but these transitions are difficult to study using this type of recalled data, as the transitions between jobs occurring to older incumbents in the dataset are restricted to the more recent calender time. This, combined with the relative stability of older workers, means that only a very small proportion of transitions (approximately 10%) occur to incumbents over the age of 40.

The dataset was weighted to overcome the over- and under-sampling which occurred in the selection of respondents (the unemployed were over-sampled, the Kish grid procedure for sampling an individual within each household provided some slight non-representative sampling, and women were unintentionally oversampled). Each transition was weighted by the weight of the corresponding individual, and the weights were then recalibrated to a mean of 1.

Issues of non-independence[5] need to be considered in a pooled dataset, but with the very large N and cell sizes in this case, the inaccuracies introduced are trivial in comparison to the other errors involved in the use of survey and work-history data.

A second set of analyses will also be described in this paper, looking at the mirror of the flow from secure jobs; the departures from insecure jobs will be examined, so that the processes that determine whether an individual returns to secure employment or remains in insecure employment can be examined. Although the route out of insecure employment is not a main theme of this paper, it is important to consider it to properly interpret the inflow figures. If, for instance, a variable was positively associated with both inflow and outflow, the interpretation would be very different from a situation where a variable accelerated the flow into, and decelerated the flow out of job insecurity.

One of the questions which was asked about each job in the work history was "When you were working as a....(JOB TITLE) for....(EMPLOYER'S NAME/ yourself) how secure did you regard your job as being?". Responses were selected from a showcard, on a four-point scale :- "A very secure job, A fairly secure job, A fairly insecure job, A very insecure job".

This self-report measure is not unproblematic, and potential biases need to be considered. First, there may be some post-hoc rationalisation of the level of security of previous jobs (eg. "It was the 1960s, so it must have been secure" or "I held it for six years and wasn't sacked, so I guess it was secure"). Second, different types of respondent may have interpreted the question and response categories differently. For instance, it is possible that men, if they tend to be more dependent on job security, are more critical of the job security of their jobs, and therefore tend to rate their jobs lower on job security than women. Third, respondents might rate their jobs differently at different points in their life-cycle, depending upon the importance they placed on job security at that point in their career.

However, these self-report biases will be ameliorated somewhat in their impact as the analysis depends upon the comparison of two consecutive jobs held by the same individual, and both rated by that individual at the same point in time. Thus many biases will be self-cancelling to some extent in this study of changes in job insecurity.

There are two other arguments that favour the use of a subjective measure such as this over more "objective" measures such as the legal specification of the job contract. First, it could be argued that it is the subjective feelings of insecurity that cause the psychological distress rather than the objective chances of job loss. Therefore, employees who are in fact secure but (perhaps because of poor communication by management) do not realise that they are secure will suffer worse psychological well-being than employees who are "objectively" secure. Secondly, it is not at all clear what other measures might be an improvement on this. The formal nature of the job contract is one possibility, but this ignores variation in insecurity brought about by

threatened insolvency, seniority, changes in labour law, expansion or contraction of the industrial sector, enterprise norms in the use of dismissals, and so on.

For the purposes of the analyses here, this scale was treated as a dichotomous variable, combining the first two and last two response categories (exploratory analyses showed that, in the vast majority of cases, this made little difference to the substantive results).

As the principle research question here is how individuals can be dislodged from secure jobs into insecure jobs, only those transitions between jobs that started in "very secure" or "fairly secure" jobs were included in the first set of analyses.

b. Transitions from secure jobs

Exploratory analyses found a very clear difference between job changes which involved a change of employer and those which did not involve a change in employer (the latter group included promotions, changes of job title or changes between part-time and full time work). When a transition from a secure job involved the changing of employers, 15.5% of the destination jobs were described as "fairly insecure" or "very insecure", whereas if employees remain with the same employer, the chance of the destination job being insecure was only 8.2%. Furthermore, there were complex interactions between this variable - internal versus external transitions, and many other variables in the dataset. Some of the internal changes would have been very minor sideways moves[6] (many of which were presumably omitted from the dataset through under-reporting), others quite significant promotions. The SCELI work history dataset did not permit one to be able to distinguish well between types or importance of internal changes. For the sake of clarity and parsimony, therefore, the analyses here will only concentrate on the more straightforward external changes. These made up 68.5% of the 14,148 changes from secure jobs in the dataset, and, accounted for 81.2% of the transitions from secure to insecure jobs.

Of all the "destination jobs" from these 9,692 secure jobs in the work histories, 46.2% were described as very secure, 38.3% as fairly secure, 10.2% as fairly insecure and 5.4% as very insecure. For the purposes of these analyses this will be dichotomised into the 84.5% secure and 15.5% insecure jobs. A variety of variables can be used to predict whether the next job after a secure job will be secure or insecure: they will be discussed under headings of demographic characteristics (including previous labour market experiences), characteristics of last job, characteristics of the transition and characteristics of the labour market, before being entered into a multivariate logistic regression model.

i. Demographic characteristics and labour market history.

As Table 1 shows, the main demographic variable to influence the security of the destination job was gender. Men's secure jobs were more likely to be followed by insecure jobs (16.7%) than women's secure jobs (14.4%) ($X^2(1)=9.5$, $p<0.005$). No significant effects were found for ethnic group, father's social class, school qualifications or age on making the transition (all $ps>0.05$). The only variable reflecting previous labour market histories to be significant was previous self-employment; those who had been self-employed in any of their previous jobs were much more likely to become insecure in their next job (19.9%) than those who had never been self-employed (15.3%) ($X^2(1)=5.6$, $p<0.02$). Previous spells of unemployment were not significantly related to the transition from secure to insecure jobs.

ii. Characteristics of the source jobs

Several characteristics of the source jobs predicted whether it would be followed by another secure job. The following characteristics were all associated, such that more skilled or advantaged incumbents were protected from job insecurity. Registrar General's Social Class (1980) had a very strong influence on chances of slipping into insecure work[7]. At one extreme, professional jobs were followed by insecure jobs only 10.1% of the time, but for all manual jobs the rate was

between 16.2 and 17.1% ($X^2(5)=23.4$, $p<0.001$). There was also an effect of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC 1980) of the source job, with transitions into insecurity being less likely in "financial services" (14.1%) or "other services" (13.9%) than all of the other SIC categories combined (16.1%) ($X^2(1)=6.9$, $p<0.01$)[8].

None of the following characteristics of the source job were significantly related to the probability of security vs insecurity in the next job: size of establishment, trade union membership, hours worked (including full vs part time), having promotion prospects, holding supervisory responsibility, gendering of occupation (once gender of incumbent was controlled for) or length of tenure of previous job (all Ps >0.05).

iii. Nature of the transition

Respondents were asked for the principal reason for each job departure. Those who left "to get a better job" were much less likely to transfer to insecure jobs (11.5%) than those who left for family reasons (16.6%), involuntarily (21.4%) or for "other" reasons (19.5%) ($X^2(3)=99.2$, $p<0.001$). Perhaps the surprising thing here is not the difference, but the fact that even those who left "to get a better job" accounted for such a large proportion (36%) of all flows into insecure employment.

Whilst details of the exact remuneration for each job were not collected in the dataset, respondents were asked whether their transition involved a pay increase, decrease or no change. There was a highly significant relationship ($X^2(2)=98$, $p<0.001$) whereby those who took pay cuts were much more likely to arrive in an insecure job (22.7%) than those who had pay increases or no change (13.3% and 14.4% respectively). This suggests that, rather than being compensated for job insecurity with increased pay, those who gain in terms of pay are the most likely to remain secure.

Any gap between leaving one employer and starting the next job was strongly associated with a move into insecurity. Only 13.6% of those

who went straight into another job became insecurely employed, compared to 20.7% of those who had a period out of paid work for longer than a month ($X^2(4)=70.8$, $p<0.001$) (but there was no relationship between the length of the gap and the rate of insecurity).

iv. Labour market conditions.

There was a stark break in the time series before and after 1979, with far higher levels of job insecurity in the time period from 1979 to 1986 than from 1966 to 1979 (13.2% versus 20.7%)($X^2(2)=84.7$, $p<0.001$). The extent to which this was due to the rapid and sustained rise in unemployment which occurred between 1979 and 1981, or to other government interventions to "flexibilize" the labour market is not apparent. Although the rise in insecurity tracks the changes in unemployment over that time-period reasonably closely, there may be other factors which brought about these heightened perceptions of job insecurity, such as elevated levels of bankruptcy and receiverships, and also changes in labour law, such as reduced unfair dismissal coverage, to promote labour market flexibility.

There was also an area effect with the highest rate of transfer to insecurity in Kirkcaldy (18.3%) (where high unemployment had been endemic for some time; all of the other areas had rates between 13.8 and 16.6%) ($X^2(5)=17.4$, $p<0.01$). However, there were other local labour markets which also had high rates of unemployment, (i.e. Rochdale and Coventry) with much lower rates of transfer to insecurity. This result is therefore not easily interpretable[9].

v. Multivariate analysis

Having examined the individual effects of a number of independent variables of the job security of the destination job, their combined effect will now be examined. All of the demographic, previous job, labour market condition and nature of transition variables were entered into a forward conditional entry logistic regression, in SPSS (PIN=0.02, POUT=0.01[10]). Five variables were entered (using selective "forward" entry), the others did not explain any additional

variance. The entered variables were period (pre-post 1979) (Wald[11]=71.6, df=1, p<0.001), social class (Wald=18.2, df=5, p<0.01), sex (Wald=17.0, df=1, p<0.001), local labour market (Wald=15.6, df=5, p<0.01), and reason for leaving job (Wald=78.4, df=1, p<0.001)[12]:-

$$\log[\frac{ps}{1-ps}] = \alpha + \beta_C C + \beta_S S + \beta_R R + \beta_L L + \beta_P P$$

Where ps=probability of destination job being secure,
$1-ps$=probability of destination job being insecure
α=Destination job constant
C=Social Class $_C$
S=Sex $_S$
R=Reason for leaving previous job $_R$
L=Local Labour Market $_L$
P=Period $_P$

All of the five variables' relationships with the dependent variable were consistent with the relationships detailed in Table 1. Several further checks were done on the analyses, but none of them added anything to the analysis. For instance, the "reason for leaving previous job" variable was excluded from the analysis, as it could be argued that it was further down the causal chain than other variables, and thus masking their impact; although this changed (to a limited degree) the Wald coefficients of the variables in the model, it did not permit any other variables to enter the model. Finally, the degree of security of the previous job was entered into the model ("very secure" or "quite secure"), to investigate whether variability in initial security might be causing spurious relationships. Although it was highly significant itself, it did not exclude any of the other variables from the model, nor did it have anything but a very minor influence on the Wald coefficients and significance of the other terms in the model.

As a further test of change over time, the "period" variable was also entered as an interaction term with all of the other significant variables in the model, to investigate changing importance of the

variables in the model over time. None of the interaction terms were significant, suggesting that the relationships had not changed over the 20 year period 1966-1986.

c. Transitions from insecure jobs

There were a total of 3212 transitions from (very or quite) insecure jobs in the dataset. Again there was a large difference dependent upon whether there was a change of employer. When the transition did not involve a change of employer (ie promotions, changes between part and full time, changes in job description, etc) 66.0% of the subsequent jobs were also "very" or "quite" insecure. By contrast, when the transition involved a change of employment, only 38.3% of the destination jobs were insecure ($X^2(3)=150$, $p<0.001$), the other 61.7% being "very" or "quite" secure. These figures suggest that there was a considerable flow from insecure jobs into secure jobs. Again, using the same independent variables as in the previous analyses, only those transitions which involved a change of employer were analysed to see which sorts of individuals or jobs were most likely to make the transition back[13] from insecure employment to secure employment.

i. Demographic characteristics and labour market history

There was again a very strong sex effect, with males who were in insecure employment being more likely to remain in insecure employment (41.2%) than females (34.0%) ($X^2(1)=13.6$, $p<0.001$). Age of starting destination job was linearly related to remaining in insecure employment, with only 36.5% of the youngest group (<20 years old) remaining, compared to 43.5% of the oldest group (35-40) (X^2(Mantel-Haenszel test of linear association)=5.9(1), $p<0.02$). Ethnic group, school qualifications and father's social class were all non-significant.

There was also a very strong effect of unemployment prior to the change. When an individual had never been unemployed, only 35.9% of ensuing jobs were insecure, but this increased linearly with the

number of spells of unemployment, up to 52.4% for those with 3 or more spells ($X^2(3)=18.5$, $p<0.001$)

ii. Nature of source job

There was a very strong effect of industry of source job on the likelihood of an individual staying in insecure employment. Individuals were most likely to remain in insecure employment when departing jobs in construction (45.9%) and the primary sectors of extraction, energy, water and agriculture, forestry and fishing (45.2%) and least likely to stay in insecure jobs if they were leaving a job in financial services (21.7%) or transport (29%) ($X^2(9)=40.0$, $p<0.001$).

Trade union membership was also strongly associated with failure to escape from insecurity. 45.3% of those who were members of a trade union in their source job stayed in insecure jobs, compared to 36.1% who were not members ($X^2(1)=15.9$, $p<0.001$). This apparent disadvantage of those in trade unions may (like the other effects here) reflect selection rather than cause; it may be, for instance, that trade union membership is highest among those employees in labour market segments where insecurity is commonplace and very difficult to elude. This "selection vs cause" issues is, unfortunately, impossible to deal with using this data. Even the temporal sequencing, which makes the data more amenable to drawing causal inferences from than simple cross-sectional data, does not provide conclusive proof of causal ordering; individuals are still likely to anticipate risk and react to it.

There was a strong relationship, too, with numbers of hours worked. Full-time employees were more likely to stay in insecure employment (39.9%) than part-timers (32.3%) (self-employeds were even less likely to remain in insecure employment (29.1%) ($X^2(3)=12.3$, $p<0.01$)). Those who worked very long hours (50 or more) were the worst effected, with 51.1% remaining in insecure employment.

There was a significant, but non-linear, effect of social class of source job on job security of destination job. Those most likely to remain in insecure employment were the skilled manual (43.7%) and

professional (40.7%) with clerical workers being the least likely to remain insecure (29.5%) ($X^2(5)=28.2$, $p<0.01$). Those with supervisory responsibility were also more likely to stay in insecure employment (44.5% versus 37.4%) ($X^2(1)=5.5$: $p<0.02$).

Having promotion prospects, size of workplace, closeness of supervision, public versus private sector and length of tenure in previous job were all unrelated to the probability of security in the next job.

iii. Nature of the transition

The reason for leaving the previous job was important in determining whether the next job was also insecure. When the job was left voluntarily for a better job, only 34.9% of the ensuing jobs were insecure, but if the departure came about through redundancy or dismissal 41.8% of ensuing jobs were insecure (the figures were 36.4% and 36.1% for departures for domestic reasons and "other" reasons ($X^2(3)=10.8$, $p<0.02$)). There was also a non-linear relationship with the pay comparison between the two jobs, with a pay increase or decrease being associated with lower rates of insecurity in the next job (32.5% and 36.3%) whereas those staying on about the same pay were very much more likely to remain insecure (52.7%) ($X^2(2)=75$, $p<0.001$). This suggests that some employees manage to elevate themselves into jobs which are both better paid and more secure, whereas others may take a pay cut in order to attain security, but the transition into security is less likely when pay stays level between two jobs.

Whether there was a period out of employment between the two jobs was not related to the probability of a return to secure employment.

iv. Labour market conditions

There was a reduction in the likelihood of escaping insecure employment over the period 1966-1986, with the break point again occurring around about 1979 ($x(4)=10.5$, $p<0.04$)). Before 1979, the

percentage remaining in insecure jobs averaged 35.9%, after 1979 it averaged 41.3%.

There was also a local labour market effect, varying between Northampton where 31.0% of jobs succeeding insecure jobs were also insecure, to Kirkcaldy (42.3%) and Swindon (42.4%) ($X^2(5)=19.2$, $p<0.01$). Although no further analyses were done to illuminate the reasons for these regional effects, they are not consistent with any straightforward difference in the local economies or local rates of unemployment.

v. Multivariate analysis

All of the demographic, previous job, labour market condition and nature of transition variables were entered into a forward conditional entry logistic regression, in SPSS (PIN=0.05, POUT =0.1[14]). The five variables to enter were industry (Wald=24.5, df=5, $p<0.001$), trade union membership (Wald=10.1, df=1, $p=0.001$), hours worked (Wald=27.5, df=2, $p<0.001$) and self-employment Vs employee of previous job (Wald=9.5, df=1, $p<0.01$), and calendar time (period) (Wald=11.5, df=4, $p<0.05$):-

$$\log[\frac{ps}{1-ps}] = \alpha + \beta_H H + \beta_I I + \beta_P P + \beta_E E + \beta_T T$$

Where ps=probability of destination job being secure,
$1-ps$=probability of destination job being insecure,
α=Destination Job (constant)
H=Hours of Work $_H$
I=Industrial Sector $_I$
P=Period $_P$
E=Employment Status (self-employed / employee) $_E$
T=Trade Union Membership $_T$

The effects were all consistent with the bivariate effects for those five variables, detailed in Table 2. Again, interactions between the period variable and the other independent variables were investigated, but

none of them even approached statistical significance.

4. Conclusions

Four variables have found to be significant predictors of a slide from job security into job insecurity. They will, in the first place, be discussed separately, and in light of the subsequent analysis of flows from job insecurity.

a. Calendar time

There was a dramatic rise in the proportion of secure workers who were dislodged into insecure jobs, with the change point being around 1979, the start of a very deep recession which saw unemployment rise to levels more than three times as high as anything that had been experienced in the post-WWII years. This is entirely consistent with the many writings that have hypothesised that such a change took place (Casey, 1988, Rubery, 1989), but in fact the evidence has been difficult to demonstrate, given the many different sources of increased job insecurity. Some of the increase in subjective feelings of insecurity may have come about directly with the rise in unemployment; some may be attributable to legislation which was intended to make it easier for employers to make redundancies and dismissals - for instance the increase in the length of service needed for protection from unfair dismissals from two to five years; some of the rise may have been caused by the increasing numbers of bankruptcies and business failures.

This effect is all the more alarming given that there is also a reverse effect for the escape from insecure jobs back into secure employment. Thus job insecurity became both more likely to enter and more difficult to escape from after 1979. However, it must be emphasised that the dataset employed for these analyses was collected in 1986, and it is possible that the patterns of job insecurity after this year are importantly different from the processes identified in this paper.

b. Gender

The fact that secure males are more likely, when changing jobs, to become insecure, than secure women is a finding of interest, which cannot be easily explained. Some of the difference can be put down to the greater flow to insecurity from (male-dominated) manufacturing and primary industrial sectors than from the (female-dominated) service sectors, but the effect is still strong even after these effects have been controlled for. The negative effects for men of becoming insecure are exacerbated by the fact that men leaving insecure jobs are less likely to escape back into secure jobs than women leaving insecure jobs.

c. Area

Kirkcaldy was the exceptional case in terms of the six local labour markets studied, with higher rates of flows into job insecurity than the others. Kirkcaldy had for some time had above average rates of unemployment, caused by the decline of its traditional manufacturing base, but in this respect it was similar to Rochdale, which had below average rates of flow into insecure jobs. This effect must, therefore, remain as something of a mystery, although it does not detract from any of the other effects in the model, and is the weakest effect of the independent variables entered.

d. Reason for leaving

There was a clear difference in the security of the destination employment depending upon the reason for leaving the previous employment, with the flow into insecurity being highest following an involuntary departure, and lowest following a departure to get a better job. Perhaps the only surprising thing about this relationship is that even when leaving a secure job voluntarily, 12% of destination jobs are insecure. These may be primarily cases where individuals give up secure jobs for riskier jobs in smaller, expanding companies (particularly in times of more rapid economic growth).

e. Social class

This finding is perhaps the most important of the analyses; there is clear evidence that higher social class is a protecting factor against the drift into insecurity. Anyone who had assumed (having read the academic literature on job insecurity perhaps) that job insecurity was a blight on the professionals in society was, it seems, mistaken. Not only have the less advantaged in our society had to contend with greater polarisation in terms of income, they have had the double blow of being hit the hardest by the rising rate of job insecurity. The differential flows into job insecurity will act to further polarise the labour market between the advantaged and disadvantaged.

The finding that professionals and skilled workers are most likely to remain in insecure jobs after entering them is, on the face of it, somewhat surprising, and no fully convincing explanation can be given without further data. This result was also rather enigmatic, not remaining significant in the multi-variate model. But one possible explanation is that those two groups, being the most advantaged non-manual and manual workers respectively, are still confident enough of their future prospects in the labour market that they are willing to relinquish security for other rewards such as higher pay.

There is also some evidence that, once this slide into job insecurity starts, it can further entrap the most disadvantaged workers; those who have had several periods of unemployment prior to their insecure job find it particularly hard to regain security (and the risk of unemployment is itself more likely to befall less advantaged workers). This is consistent with much of the "underclass" literature, suggesting that once an individual becomes enmeshed in the insecure segments of the labour market, it is difficult to escape back into secure employment, and casts light on the mechanisms by which insecurity and disadvantage can perpetuate; the longer that an employee remains in such an "insecure career" the more stigmatised they may become to employers, making it, in turn, more difficult to find a path into secure employment.

This further polarisation of the labour market has worrying implications for society, beyond the widespread feeling that the gap between the advantaged and disadvantaged is unfair. There is a growing literature on the societal costs of inequality in terms of health and life expectancy (Wilkinson, 1994, 1996) and crime (Hagan, 1994) as well as general economic efficiency. While it has been generally argued as a central tenet of "New Right" thinking that increased inequality is a necessary cost of increased efficiency, Glyn & Miliband (1994) challenge this, showing no cross-country comparative link between the two. While we may not yet have a fully developed underclass in Britain, the added polarisation caused by job insecurity can only add to the social problems caused by inequality. I have already argued in this article that the link between job insecurity and employee motivation or productivity is very doubtful, and certainly unproven. I am even more doubtful that much of a justification can be given for tolerating a situation where the further burden of job insecurity is loaded onto those who already are the most disadvantaged.

Notes

1. Why this could prove individual cause is not clear - such patterns could just as well be caused by employers consistently discriminating against certain categories of individual, or by geographical polarisation.

2. The six towns involved were Aberdeen, Coventry, Kirkcaldy, Northampton, Rochdale and Swindon. They were selected somewhat haphazardly, and in part to be close to the six university teams involved in the initial project. Two (Kirkcaldy and Rochdale) had, in 1986, already had long histories of industrial decline and unemployment. Two (Coventry and Northampton) had more recently suffered collapses of their main manufacturing bases. Swindon was an example of a town which had been unusually successful in replacing its older manufacturing base with high-tech and service industries. And Aberdeen had been a boom town due to the off-shore oil industry, but had just started to feel the effects of an oil-price induced recession in the mid-nineteen eighties. However, taken together, many of the unique features of each of these labour markets largely cancelled each other out and resemble aggregate data for the UK in many respects (Marsh and Vogler, 1994). For the purposes of this paper the data from these six labour markets are being aggregated together.

3. A non-rectangular dataset is one where there are a different number of variables recorded for each case.

4. It is no way implied that job insecurity is a lesser problem for older workers. Indeed, Noble and Westergaard's study of redundant steelworkers (1983) found those who were in their fifties, victims of ageism but too young to retire, suffered the most acute problems in the labour market.

5. The non-independence in this case is caused by the fact that more than one job change was derived from any one respondent, and

those job changes were likely to be more similar to each other than job changes taken from different respondents.

6. Interviewers were instructed to record a new job if there was a change of employer, a change between part-time and full-time hours of work, a change of job description or a change in supervisory responsibility.

7. This scheme for the classification of occupation divides occupation, primarily on the basis of skills, into six categories. Non-manual occupations are divided into professional and upper management: intermediate (eg. teachers, middle managers, etc): and clerical. Manual jobs are divided into skilled (ie apprenticed), semi-skilled and unskilled occupations.

8. All other SIC categories were combined for these analyses as there were no apparent differences between them, and the small numbers in several of the groups detracted from the analyses.

9. To further complicate the interpretation of the "area" findings in this dataset, while the respondents were resident in those localities at the time of the survey in 1986, a small proportion of the transitions would have occurred when some of them resided in other local labour markets before migrating to the study areas.

10. PIN refers to the threshold significance level (P) of the variable below which it is entered in to the equation. Similarly POUT refers to the significance of the variable above which a variable is taken out of the equation.

11. The Wald statistic tests the null hypothesis that each individual independent variable in a logistic regression model is zero.

12. In fact, to minimise the effect of missing values, once the five significant variables had been identified, the model was re-run

with just those five variables. This reduced the number of missing cases from 12.7% to 2.4%, but did not have any major effect on the parameters of the model.

13. "back" implies that they were returning to secure employment. Some of them may have been continuously in insecure jobs since leaving full-time education, and will be experiencing job security for the first time.

14. The entry criterion was relaxed slightly from the 0.01 level in the previous multivariate analysis to compensate for the smaller sample size.

TABLES

Table 1. Security Of Destination Job In Transitions From Secure Jobs, By Statistically Significant Independent Variables.

	Job Security Of Destination Job			
	Secure		Insecure	
	Row %	Count	Row %	Count
TOTAL	84.5	8027	15.5	1474
AREA				
Aberdeen	85.2	1462	14.8	254
Coventry	85.4	1132	14.6	194
Kirkcaldy	81.7	1308	18.3	294
Northampton	83.4	1522	16.6	303
Rochdale	85.4	1345	14.6	229
Swindon	86.2	1258	13.8	201
SEX OF RESPONDENT				
Male	83.3	4003	16.7	800
Female	85.6	4024	14.4	675
R-G SOCIAL CLASS 1980 FOR SOURCE JOB				
Professional	89.9	238	10.1	27
Intermediate	87.2	1182	12.8	174
Clerical	85.6	2250	14.4	379
Skilled Manual	83.2	2002	16.8	405
Semi Skilled Manual	82.9	1791	17.1	370
Unskilled Manual	83.8	486	16.2	94
SELF EMPLOYED IN PAST?				
Never	84.7	7737	15.3	1402
At least once	80.1	290	19.9	72
SOURCE JOB INDUSTRY (SIC80)				
Financial Services	85.9	399	14.1	66
Other Services	86.1	1882	13.9	304
All Other Industries	83.9	5663	16.1	5663
REASON FOR LEAVING PREVIOUS JOB				
Personal/family reasons	83.0	2001	17.0	409
For better job	88.1	3933	11.9	530
Employers decision	78.4	1040	21.6	287
Other reason	80.8	978	19.2	232
PAY COMPARISON FOR CURRENT JOB				
A better paid job	86.7	4552	13.3	700
A similarly paid job	85.6	1838	14.4	310
A worse paid job	77.3	1513	22.7	444
GAP BETWEEN JOBS?				
No gap between jobs	86.4	5994	13.6	946
Gap of 1 month or more	79.3	2028	21.7	529
PERIOD OF JOB CHANGE				
1966 – 1979	86.8	5724	13.2	874
1979 – 1986	79.3	2303	20.7	600

Table 2. Security Of Destination Job In Transitions From Insecure Jobs, By Statistically Significant Independent Variables.

	Job Security Of Destination Job			
	Secure		Insecure	
	Row %	Count	Row %	Count
TOTAL	61.5	1574	38.1	974
SEX OF RESPONDENT				
Male	58.8	877	41.2	615
Female	66.0	697	34.0	359
UNEMPLOYMENT IN WORK HISTORY				
None	64.1	985	35.9	552
One spell	61.1	370	38.9	235
Two spells	58.4	141	41.6	101
Three or more spells	47.6	78	52.4	86
TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP FOR SOURCE JOB				
Yes	54.7	321	45.3	266
No	63.9	1234	36.1	698
EMPLOYMENT STATUS FOR SOURCE JOB				
Self employment	70.9	66	29.1	27
Full-time employee	60.1	1214	39.9	807
Part-time employee	67.7	229	32.3	109
Working on a government scheme	67.7	65	32.3	31
NO OF HOURS PER WEEK FOR PREVIOUS JOB				
Less than 8 hours per week	52.0	14	48.0	12
8 – 15 hours per week	67.6	68	32.4	33
16 – 22 hours per week	69.1	95	30.9	42
23 – 30 hours per week	71.9	71	28.1	28
31 – 35 hours per week	66.0	99	34.0	51
36 – 40 hours per week	62.3	759	37.7	459
41 – 45 hours per week	63.6	155	36.4	89
46 – 49 hours per week	65.6	105	34.4	55
50 – more hours per week	48.9	187	51.1	195
R-G SOCIAL CLASS 1980 FOR SOURCE JOB				
Professional	59.3	27	40.7	19
Intermediate	61.1	128	38.9	82
Clerical	70.5	413	29.5	173
Skilled Manual	56.3	411	43.7	319
Semi-Skilled Manual	61.3	398	38.7	252
Unskilled Manual	60.9	191	39.1	123
SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOURCE JOB				
Supervisory	55.5	159	44.5	128
Non-Supervisory	62.6	1329	37.4	794
REASON FOR LEAVING SOURCE JOB				
Personal/family reasons	63.6	205	36.4	117
For better job	65.1	601	34.9	323
Employers decision	58.2	611	41.8	438
Other reason	63.9	147	36.1	83

Table 2 Continued. Security Of Destination Job In Transitions From Insecure Jobs, By Statistically Significant Independent Variables.

	Job Security Of Destination Job			
	Secure		Insecure	
	Row %	Count	Row %	Count
PAY COMPARISON BETWEEN JOBS				
A better paid job	67.5	946	32.5	455
A similarly paid job	47.3	288	52.7	321
A worse paid job	63.7	322	36.3	184
PERIOD OF TRANSITION				
1966 – 1971	62.1	280	37.9	171
1971 – 1976	65.7	358	34.3	187
1976 – 1979	64.4	278	35.6	154
1979 – 1982	60.6	288	39.4	188
1982 – 1986	57.3	369	42.7	274
AREA				
Aberdeen	62.1	257	37.9	156
Coventry	64.6	233	35.4	127
Kirkcaldy	57.7	285	42.3	209
Northampton	69.0	328	31.0	147
Rochdale	59.5	243	40.5	165
Swindon	57.6	229	42.4	168
AGE AT TRANSITION				
<20	63.7	585	36.3	333
20-25	60.3	228	39.7	151
25-30	60.9	278	39.1	178
30-35	59.7	212	40.3	143
35-40	56.5	153	43.5	118
INDUSTRY OF SOURCE JOB				
Agriculture, etc.	59.1	32	40.9	22
Energy and water supply	43.6	30	56.4	39
Extraction of minerals	64.9	9	35.1	16
Metal goods, engineering	61.8	225	38.2	139
Other manufacturing	64.8	209	35.2	114
Construction	54.1	222	45.9	189
Distribution, hotels	64.7	373	35.3	204
Transport and comms	71.0	59	29.0	24
Financial services	78.3	83	21.7	23
Other services	61.2	281	38.8	178

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