## FINANCING THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR





CEEPR & EPRG Intl Energy Policy Conf. Strategies for 2050 Carbon Neutrality in East Asia Seoul, June 27-28, 2022 John Parsons Assoc. Director, CEEPR jparsons@mit.edu

#### A Diverse Field of Nuclear

- Existing LWRs financing life extensions.
  - Generally, a cost-efficient sources of low-carbon energy.
  - The economics are clear, the politics are tough.
  - Electricity market details obscure the value.
- New builds of traditional, large LWRs.
  - High costs must be reduced. MIT study identified options.
  - Financing difficulties can be a scapegoat.
  - The UK has been a laboratory for alternative financing models.




#### A Diverse Field of Nuclear (2)

- SMRs.
  - How different from LWRs?
- Advanced Reactors Gen IV.
  - Offer improved safety paradigm with important implications.
  - Lower cost is hoped for, but not yet demonstrated.
  - Significant RD&D costs remain.
- Microreactors



# New Deployment Paradigm for Nuclear Fission

- Small, 1-20 MW
  heat/elect
- Factory built
- Transportable
- Plug-and-play
- Semiautonomous operation
- Fuel handling offsite only.





#### Siting Flexibility



factories and chemical plants



EV charging

district heating



#### New Business Model

- Work of a current student, Santiago Andrade (LGO)
- Product is dramatically different from historical nuclear.
  - Customer is industrial and commercial businesses.
  - Quality is valued by customer.
  - Volume in equipment and customers.
- 2 Questions:
  - What must change from existing nuclear?
  - What can be ported from 'distributed fossil' business model?
- The energy consumer becomes the customer.
- Selling energy service vs. selling equipment.
- How does financing change?

# PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND PRIVATE FINANCING OF NUCLEAR POWER

#### Focus Questions

- Can nuclear new build be financed by private investors?
- How does wholesale electricity market design affect investor decisions?
- Should governments support nuclear investments and how?



#### Experimentation in the UK

#### • The foundation.

- A strong national commitment to decarbonization.
- A long-range strategic perspective.
- A decision that new nuclear is one part of the solution.
- Hinkley Point C employed a Contract-for-Differences (CfD) to provide a hedge to investor against market risk.
  - Construction risk remains with the investor.
- Sizewell C may use the Regulated Asset Base (RAB) model.
  - The government will share construction risk.



#### Conventional Wisdom in the US

- New build nuclear is not possible in regions with competitive wholesale power markets.
  - Only conceivable in regions with traditional rate-of-return regulated utilities.
  - Blunders at Vogtle and Summer cast a shadow even there.
- In recent years there have been complaints that structural features of wholesale electricity markets are unfair to nuclear.



#### Point #1: Cost is Key

- Recent new build projects in the U.S. and western Europe have had lengthy construction delays and large cost overruns.
- No amount of creative finance is going to erase high costs. New financial models are not a substitute for reducing actual construction costs.



# Point #2. Blaming the Market is Misdirection

#### • Short memories.

- In the 2000s, owners of U.S. nuclear plants added nearly 6 GW of nuclear capacity in the form of uprates. Research shows owners of merchant nuclear plants operating in competitive wholesale market regions were more likely to make these investments--Lei, Tsai and Kleit (2017).
- In the early 2000s, amidst speculation of a nuclear renaissance, many prospective new builds were located in regions with competitive wholesale markets.
- Changing prospects in the US driven in part by
  - increased capex cost for nuclear,
  - dramatic drop in the cost of natural gas,
  - lack of a strong carbon premium for nuclear, and
  - political support for and falling cost of renewables

#### Markets are Embedded in Larger Political Framework




Figure 4.2, MIT Future of Nuclear Energy in a Carbon Constrained World.

Profitability of Alternative Generation Technologies

#### Markets are Embedded in Larger Political Framework (2)

- Outright bans on nuclear.
- Punitive taxes and regulations.
- Out-of-market payments to competing technologies.
  - Tax subsidies for renewables. Portfolio mandates for renewables.
  - Significant share of electricity revenues are channeled outside the wholesale market.
  - Lowers the average wholesale market price



#### The Need is for Public Commitment

- Currently, regardless of the details of wholesale market structure, an investor in a new nuclear plant will be circumspect about whether they will be allowed to harvest whatever profit may be due on the investment.
- Zero Emissions Credits for existing nuclear plants have worked!
- Public contract with Hinkley Point C has worked.
  - The hedge of market price risk via the contract-for-difference is irrelevant.
  - Key are the provisions which specifically target public actions to seize profits.



### The Need is for Public Commitment (2)

- The UK RAB model is a trickier problem.
  - Public commitment is good.
  - How much of the construction risk for a large LWR should be absorbed by the public? We have no tool to decide this.
  - Quoted figures do not account for the cost of risk shifted onto the public.
- Demonstration of advanced nuclear designs also warrants a public investment, per MIT Future of Nuclear Energy study.
  - Political will has not yet been tested.



### Net Zero Goals Deepen the Challenge

- The generation profile is changing rapidly, driven by evolving policies and developing political forces.
  - Market design is also changing.
- The future industry and market structure is hugely uncertain.
  - Mix of politics and technological uncertainty.
- Incentivizing large investments in fixed assets will require social/political commitment.
  - Wholesale market prices may channel an ever smaller share of industry revenue.
- Schmalensee (2019) Strengths and Weaknesses of Traditional Arrangements for Electricity Supply
  - <u>http://ceepr.mit.edu/publications/working-papers/710</u>
  - Ch. 2 in Handbook on the Economics of Electricity (J.M. Glachant, P.L. Joskow, and M. Pollitt, eds.)

## THANK YOU