

Making the case for supporting renewable electricity

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
Delivering Ireland's energy transition
Croke Park, Dublin • 20-21 June 2019

* Deputy independent member of the SEM Committee, speaking purely in a personal capacity and not necessarily representing SEMC's views


- Why support renewables?
- How best to support renewables?
 - Get the carbon price right
 - If not make up shortfall
 - Learning externalities require capacity support
 - Auctions are better than bureaucrats
 - DS3 to address wind variability
 - Interconnectors key to high RES penetration



Green is good, red poor Island of Ireland well-endowed



Average wind velocity at hub height 2000–2005 [m/s]



EEA Technical report

No 6/2009 at


<https://www.energy.eu/publications/a07.pdf>

Wind resource up to 50m depth, hub ht 80m onshore, 120m offshore



Ireland among the top four in EU for RES share

Cumulative increment in RES share for top 8 EU-15





Why support renewables?


- Low carbon price => correct with **carbon tax**
- join GB in establishing Carbon Price Support
 - Corrects trade distortion with GB electricity
 - Raises revenue
- second best: **subsidy** €/MWh for CO₂ displaced
=> **Shortfall** @ €20/t CO₂ => **CCGT displaced** €9/MWh

Corrective taxes better than subsidies



Combined impact of GB carbon tax (CPS) and ETS


ETS and GB CO2 prices, 2011-18





GB carbon tax has reversed direction of GB-SEM trade

Flows and price difference GB-SEM, lagged quarterly moving averages






SEM DAM prices track GB prices except for high wind days

GB prices except for high wind days

DAM Volume and Average Price



SEM Price and Average Wind Forecast

Day-ahead wind forecast





The case for a SEM carbon tax on generation

- In GB **only 60% of CPS passed through** in higher wholesale prices (fossil generators bear rest)
- ISEM: generators **free to offer** into energy-only EU auction platform (except for balancing)
- Bidding up or above GB prices?
- **SEM carbon tax would likely not raise SEM wholesale prices much**
- **Reduce subsidies to renewables paid for by consumers?**

Carbon tax on generation for 2030 vision?





Why support renewables? Learning spillovers

- **Learning-by-doing** creates unrewarded spillovers that reduce later costs
 - Justifies quite large subsidy for solar PV
 - Rather less for wind (larger base, lower learning rate)
- The **larger the coalition** of the willing the more spill-overs are internalised
 - ⇒ **Mission Innovation** – 22 countries pledge to **double** clean energy R&D
 - ⇒ subsidize **installation, not output**



Learning justifies support, mostly in production and deployment

FIGURE 8: IRENA ONSHORE WIND LEARNING RATE




Quantifying the spill-over benefit

	GWp cumulative						
Country	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	shares
China	0.8	3.3	6.8	19.7	28.2	43.5	19%
Germany	17.4	24.9	32.5	35.8	38.2	39.8	17%
Japan	3.6	4.9	6.6	13.6	23.3	34.2	15%
USA	2.5	4.4	7.3	12.1	18.3	25.6	11%
Italy	3.5	12.8	16.5	18.1	18.5	18.9	8%
UK	0.1	0.9	1.9	3.4	5.1	8.9	4%
France	1.2	3.0	4.1	4.7	5.7	6.6	3%
subtotal	29.1	54.1	75.6	107.3	137.2	177.5	76%
Global cumulative capacity	47.0	78.0	110.0	144.0	184.0	234.0	100%
spillover per kWp	\$822	\$740	\$664	\$595	\$531	\$472	

Table Spillover contributions by country					total \$ million/yr			
Country	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	cumulative	share
Germany	\$14,276	\$5,536	\$5,049	\$1,964	\$1,292	\$737	\$28,855	21%
China	\$657	\$1,849	\$2,324	\$7,681	\$4,499	\$7,234	\$24,245	18%
Japan	\$2,973	\$958	\$1,141	\$4,142	\$5,148	\$5,120	\$19,482	14%
USA	\$2,078	\$1,372	\$1,918	\$2,858	\$3,291	\$3,454	\$14,970	11%
Italy	\$2,878	\$6,883	\$2,420	\$963	\$205	\$219	\$13,568	10%
UK	\$63	\$612	\$662	\$878	\$916	\$1,799	\$4,930	4%
France	\$989	\$1,309	\$741	\$382	\$492	\$438	\$4,352	3%
subtotal	\$23,915	\$18,519	\$14,255	\$18,869	\$15,842	\$19,001	\$110,402	80%
range +/-	\$7,323	\$5,266	\$3,727	\$4,480	\$3,360	\$3,522	\$27,678	



UK Off-shore wind auctions dramatically cut prices





- Learning spill-overs need remuneration

- Almost entirely from making and installing equipment


⇒ Contract €X/MWh for (e.g.) 30,000 MWh/MW, auction determines premium €X

Reasons:

- Subsidy targeted on source of learning = *investment aid*
 - Reduces cost of capital and risk via debt finance
 - Ideally associated with CO₂ credit per MWh
- Does not amplify benefits of high wind/sun
 - Not over-reward favoured locations with same learning
- Auction better than bureaucrats at minimizing cost



Handling high and low wind in SEM: DS3 essential



DS3 already delivering benefits; SNSP to 75%

Faster more flexible responses needed with high renewables

Synchronous inertia – supplied by fossil generators, not by wind and PV





Figure 1: Frequency Control Services (Source: EirGrid)

Sustained high or low wind periods over six weeks


maximum and minimum 9-hrly averages over 6 week periods



Interconnectors more useful than storage for these conditions

Exporting up to 580 MW reduces curtailment

Wind penetration rates 2008 and 2009 (scaled to 2020)





- Island of Ireland has wonderful wind
- SEM/DS3 programme an excellent model
- Support for **RES** needs change
 - recognise **learning benefits** by **capacity support**,
 - **value CO₂ by carbon tax (failing which subsidy per MWh)**
 - needs better **location** and dispatch price signals
 - => Pay for RES at **time/place energy value**
 - market responsive requires **auctions** and **good network tariffs**
- Interconnectors increasingly valuable now coupled
 - can buffer low and high wind penetration
 - But asymmetric carbon price reduces value
 - => **align carbon taxes with GB**



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Acronyms and appendices

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Acronyms

CfD	Contract for Difference
CPS`	Carbon price support = carbon tax
DS3	Delivering a Secure, Sustainable Electricity System
ETS	Emissions trading System
EV	Electric vehicle
LMP	Locational marginal price or nodal price
RES	Renewable electricity supply
ROC	Renewable Obligation Certificate
T	Transmission

GB RES CfD 2015 auction better than bureaucrats


Technology		admin price	lowest clearing price	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	Total Capacity (MW)
Advanced Conversion Technologies	£/MWh MW	£140	£114.39			£119.89 36	£114.39 26	62
Energy from Waste with Combined Heat and Power	£/MWh MW	£80	£80				£80.00 94.75	94.75
Offshore wind	£/MWh MW	£140	£114.39			£119.89 714	£114.39 448	1162
Onshore wind	£/MWh MW	£95	£79.23		£79.23 45	£79.99 77.5	£82.50 626.05	748.55
Solar PV	£/MWh MW	£120	£50.00	£50.00 32.88	£79.23 36.67			69.55

Source: DECC (2015)



Monthly variability of wind

Variability of 25-day average wind in the SEM 2016-17



Location choices under LMP and spot pricing for wind

N: 2,500 hrs/yr **With ROCs wind farm inefficiently locates at N**
 P_N £35/MWh
=>£87.5k/MW/yr
=>£212.5k with ROC **ROC = £50/MWh**


Pay wind for availability + average spot price => efficient E

T cost
£15/
MWh

C: £50/MWh


E: 2,000 hrs/yr

P_E £49/MWh
=>£98k/MW/yr
=>£198k with ROC



Exporting up to 580 MW reduces curtailment

Wind penetration rates 2008 and 2009 (scaled to 2020)





- <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/commission-proposes-new-rules-consumer-centred-clean-energy-transition> gives links to the various directives
- Clean Energy For All Europeans, COM/2016/0860 final at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1481278671064&uri=CELEX:52016DC0860>
- Michael Grubb and David Newbery UK Electricity Market Reform and the Energy Transition: Emerging Lessons, at <https://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/1817-Text.pdf>
- David Newbery, David Reiner, and Robert Ritz. When is a carbon price floor desirable? At <https://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/eprg-working-paper-1816/>
- David Newbery, Michael G. Pollitt, Robert A. Ritz, Wadim Strielkowski 'Market design for a high-renewables European electricity system' *Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews*, 91, 695-707; <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2018.04.025>