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Carbon Pricing and the Restructuring of Electricity Sectors

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Carbon Pricing, Power Markets And The Competitiveness Of Nuclear Power IEA/NEA Paris 11 January 2011 http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac. uk



Outline


- The need for carbon pricing
- EU Instruments: ETS and 20-20-20 Directive

- in conflict, need reform

- Stabilising the carbon price
 taxes, banks or floors
- Restructuring electricity the UK EMR
 CO₂ floor, CfD, capacity payments, EPS, ...




Peak CO₂-warming vs cumulative emissions 1750–2500



nat

After MR Allen et al. Nature 458, 1163-1166 (2009) doi:10.1038/nature08019



Lower peak

Gradual reduction after peak Total cumulative emissions determines global warming

- Delaying peak requires a faster subsequent decline
- peak should be before 2020

Source: ENEP Emissions Gap Report 2010

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Policies for mitigating climate change

- GHG emissions are a global stock public bad
 - uncertain distant damage with uneven impacts
 - => very hard to agree coordinated policies
 - damage regardless of emissions location, persistent
 - => damage moderately independent of date of emission
 - much irreversible over historical time scales
- Solution: uniform charge for GHG emissions,
 - charge rises at discount rate
 - reset in light of new information

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
EU climate change policy

- **ETS** to price CO₂
 - fixes quantity not price => poor guide for low-C
- 20-20-20 Directive: demand pull for renewables
 justified by learning spill-overs and burden sharing
- EU SET-Plan to double R&D spend
 - to support less mature low-C options

But ETS undermined by 20-20-20




2020 projected CO2 price



Source: Committee on Climate Change, 2008 and 2009

CO₂ prices are volatile and now too low

EUA price October 2004-December 2010





Permits vs Taxes


Weitzman: Taxes superior to permits unless MB of abatement steeper than MC

CO₂ is a *global persistent stock pollutant*

- CO₂ damage today effectively same as tomorrow
- => marginal benefit of abatement essentially flat
- marginal cost of abatement rises rapidly
- future abatement costs very uncertain

Carbon tax superior to tradable permits but permits easier to introduce

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Failures of ETS

- Current ETS sets quota of total EU emissions
- Renewables Directive increases RES

 => increased RES does not reduce CO₂
 => reduces price of EUA
 => prejudices other low-C generation like nuclear
- Risks undermining support for RES
 Solved by fixing EUA price instead of quota

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Reforming ETS

- Reform EU ETS to provide rising price floor
 sufficient for nuclear *or on-shore wind if cheaper*
- Commitment to raise CO_2 price at 3% p.a. over life of plant may suffice
 - €25/EUA 2010 => €34 in 2020, €61 in 2040 ...
- Making it credible: write CfD on this path

 offer CfD at €45/EUA for 20y from commissioning?
 makes extra carbon savings additional

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Stabilising CO₂ price

- Floor price Member states receive x% of NAP each year, adjusted to support EUA price
- EU Carbon Bank
 - buys and sells EUAs to stabilise price
 - Member States resist transferring any EUAs?
- Replace by carbon tax?
 - Cheaper to implement and Cash positive
 - Covers whole economy, simplifies policy
 - underwritten by CfD on path for commitment
 - Need border tax adjustment for traded sectors?

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Competitiveness impacts

- No difference between permits and taxes
 - both raise opportunity cost of emitting CO₂
 - both raise cost of electricity by same amount
 - if auctioned Govt. gets €€, if granted Co.s get €€
- easier to rebate C tax on exports
 - border taxes on imports, or exempt traded goods?

ETS lobby-prone, so might be rebated C-taxes

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Need for market reform

- Low-C generation is capital intensive
 - except CCS has low variable cost
 - wind: v low variable cost, intermittent
- => risk of low prices much of year
 - peak and average prices set by gas +C price?
- => how to encourage investment in low-C gen?
 - economics depend on C-price over life: 40+ yrs
 - renewables supported by FITs or ROC

Nuclear power will need assurance on C price

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
UK Electricity Market Reform

- C-price floor to underwrite wholesale price
 - reduces temptation to renege on contracts
 - supports decentralised market led investment
- CfD for low-C to guarantee future revenues
 negotiated or tender auctions, technology specific
- Capacity payments to ensure peaking capacity

 and reduce risk to capital intensive plant/
- Emission performance standards
 - belt and braces to rule out unabated coal

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UK price movements: 2007 to 2009 in €



Correlation of coal+EUA on gas+EUA slightly higher at 96%





- Mutually reinforcing elements to reduce risk

 fossil generation hedged, low-C risky => CfD
 - cost of risk high for low-C
- Carbon price floor to avoid subsidy claims
 - "no subsidies to nuclear power"
 - reduces risk of renegotiating contracts
 - but risks inefficient trade if not EU wide
- Capacity payments and EPS for comfort?



Conclusions

- EU ETS CO₂ price is too low
 needs *credible* rising stabilised floor price
- RES Directive undermines ETS
 - and risks bringing ETS into disrepute
 - fixing EUA price avoids this conflict
- Most electricity markets will not deliver low-C – without contracts and/or minimum credible C price
- UK EMR is (moderately) coherent

EU carbon price floor would help

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