

Energy Regulation and Energy Services

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Plan

- Some background on the evolution of industries
- Lessons from Telecoms
- The Potential for Energy Services
- The future?



How do industries evolve?

- Stylised facts (Geroski, 1995):
- Incumbents have an advantage.
- There is lots of small scale entry and exit.
- Entrants take 5-10 years to become large.
- Incumbents don't respond to entrants immediately.
- Diversifying entry more successful than de novo entry.
- Technological and regulatory changes facilitate entry.



'Dominance by birthright'?

- Klepper and Simons (2000):
- Example of the dominance of US Radio producers in television production.
- Pre-existing firms in related industry have advantage in new ones.
 - This may be true for individuals with prior experience.
- Government policies can promote learning by new entrants (Japanese TV producers).
 - How policy can best help entrants?



UK Telecoms market shares – fixed & mobile



Source: Ofcom, market data tables



UK Telecoms market shares - broadband



Source: Ofcom, market data tables



Talk Talk Group – family tree



Observations about telecoms

- Key role of technology in evolution
- Important roles for:
 - Regulation
 - Competition Policy
- Deconstruction of value chain (Li and Whalley, 2002):
 - From value chains to value networks
 - Multiple entry and exit points
 - Complex business relations



Are energy and telecoms different?

- Joskow and Noll (1999) say yes:
- Electricity (and gas and liquid fuel):
- Almost never relies on facilities based competition
- Not switched networks
- Unsophisticated metering and control
- Little scope for innovation and technical change
- In 1999, but in 201??



Energy vs telecoms spending

consumers spending as share of UK GDP



Source: ONS, chained volume terms, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Product.asp?vlnk=242



UK household spending on energy services



Market Opportunities: Fundamentals

Electricity Prices (2009)



Source: APX, http://www.apxgroup.com/index.php?id=61



Market Opportunities: Shiftable load

Household peak in the UK (5-6 pm, responsible for 45% of system peak): breakdown by appliance type, whole UK, typical winter week-day (52016 MW)



Source: adapted from Lampaditou, E. and M. Leach (2005)



Market Opportunities: Shiftable load

- Simulation by Lampaditou and Leach (2005):
- Impacts of time of use pricing with water/wet appliances shift :
 - morning peak: 47% decrease shift of water heating
 - evening peak: 6% decrease shift of wet appliances
 - *consumers' benefits*: £52/yr per consumer (using average spot prices of random winter day from UKPX 2005).
- Impact of direct load control of major appliances at 5-6 pm (switch off & better cycling) :
 - Switch off washing machine, tumble driers, dish washers & cold appliances: 15% of household peak reduction (3500 MW)
 - Plus better cycling of water heater: 23% (5500 MW)



Some 'Known Unknowns'

- What outturn response elasticities could be:
 - London Congestion Charge experience (-0.42 actual against -0.15 predicted)
- What innovations might come along

 Telecoms suggests expect the unexpected (e.g. growth of SMS)
- Which diversifying entrants will enter
- How consumers will react
 - EDRP trials appear to be disappointing
 - Non-rational behaviour likely



The Future

- Convergence between electricity, heat and transport sectors?
- Entrants from other sectors?
- Marketer/Retailer led business models?
- Interventions from regulator to force incumbents to facilitate new business models?

Telecoms suggests any of these possible (and probably welcome).



Conclusions

- Technology will be a key facilitator
- Market potential enormous
- Incumbents have big advantages
- Diversifying entrants to be encouraged
- May take years for entry to be significant
- However new entrants should shake industry
- Regulation and competition policy needed



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